The workshop brought together 20 International Relations scholars with a shared research interest in the international dimension of contemporary populism. The workshop aimed to contribute to the growing debate, both within and outside of the SCRIPTS Cluster, about the impact of populist phenomena on the international order established after World War II and consolidated in the post-Cold War era.

Over two days, participants offered critical insights into the implications of the rise of populist leaders in global politics. In four round tables, participants discussed the best approaches to studying the effects of populism in specific thematic areas: foreign policy and diplomacy, international cooperation and regional integration, international security and human rights, and international economy, trade, and public goods.

Foreign Policy and Diplomacy

The workshop began with a panel discussing the populist impact on foreign policy and diplomacy, moderated by Michael Zürn, professor at WZB Berlin and Freie Universität Berlin and co-director of the SCRIPTS Cluster. The participants were Sandra Destradi from the University of Freiburg, Philip Giurlando from Trent University, Özgür Özdamar from Bilkent University, Bertjan Verbeek from Radboud University, and Thorsten Wojczewski from King's College London.

Panelists discussed how the rise of populism around the globe in the last decade has changed foreign policy and diplomacy practices and how the new behavioural patterns may affect international relations in the future. This discussion raised the question of whether it is possible to speak of a ‘populist foreign policy’ as a coherent phenomenon and, consequently, what the possible implications are for the analysis of the international effects of contemporary populism.
There was consensus among the participants that populists employ some of the same foreign policy mechanisms, particularly in terms of style, procedures, and channels. However, there was less common ground with respect to the substance of foreign policy, which is often conditioned by material limitations and ‘host ideologies.’ Contemporary populist leaders show a growing tendency to centralize decision-making processes as well as to personalize their implementation, placing the leader and his cult at the centre of interstate relations and public diplomacy. This is accompanied by the transnational projection of domestic politics, leading to the politicization of foreign policy and the accentuation of identity components, which are used for political mobilization. Regarding diplomatic channels, some participants stressed the populist backlash against diplomats and, in contrast, their reliance on intelligence bodies to conduct diplomatic interactions, in addition to public diplomacy based on a cult of leadership. Some scholars also emphasized populists’ preference for bilateral relations and simultaneous use of ad-hoc multilateralism for transnational coalition building.

The panelists agreed that populists are certainly not the only type of political leaders that employ these styles, procedures, and channels for foreign policy and diplomacy; yet they claimed that populists tend to radicalize their use and, therefore, to catalyze changes in the ways in which political actors conduct their international interactions. Moreover, they identified differences between populist leaders in the scope and relative importance of these patterns, since several constraints condition their implementation, including power asymmetries, geopolitical contexts, economic needs, internal pressures, characteristics of the political system, and ideational backgrounds.

These understandings and reservations raised the question of whether populism matters. Some participants have questioned what the relevance of these patterns is if the populist governments have hardly anything in common in  ideological terms. From this point of view, populist leaders may be changing the shared norms and practices of foreign policy and diplomacy, but it is doubtful that they are influencing the international order more substantially.

The most evident consequences of populist foreign policies, either intended or not, seem to be the loss of states’ reputations, the unpredictability of international relationships, the undermining of institutionalized cooperation, and the proliferation of international scandals. Audience comments and participants’ responses stressed the importance of further research that assesses the validity of these hypotheses and evaluates the variance among populist governments in different regions (‘North’ vs. ‘South’), ideological backgrounds (‘Left’ vs. ‘Right’), and material capabilities.

International Cooperation and Regional Integration

The second roundtable of the workshop addressed the populist impact on international cooperation and regional integration. The academics who presented their research projects and perspectives were Gorkem Altinors from Bilecik University, Rubrick Biegon from the University of Kent, Agnese Pacciardi from Radboud University, Fredrik Söderbaum from the University of Gothenburg, Kilian Spandler from the University of Gothenburg, and Leslie Wehner from the University of Bath, while Daniel Wajner from the SCRIPTS Cluster moderated the discussion.

Participants discussed some of the accumulated knowledge about how contemporary populist leaders collaborated with  other international actors and consequently affected cooperative relations (for example, between the United States, the EU, Russia, and China). Given that the backlash against international organizations and their bureaucrats is central to contemporary populism, panelists debated whether populist governments are inherently ‘isolationists’ and whether the very idea of international cooperation is in danger in the wake of new global crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic. The conversation focused on how regional integration has been affected by populist leaders and parties, both when they were in the opposition and when they simultaneously seized power in many countries.

To this end, participants presented existing evidence of populist leaders’ attempts at cooperation on migration and refugees (Turkey-EU), interregional negotiations (the Trans-Pacific Partnership), the discursive framings of regional cooperation and the consequent institutional preferences (in the Americas, Europe, and Asia), and the mechanisms underlying the effects of populism on regional integration in Latin America. In this sense, some scholars emphasized the populist role in stimulating the rejection of international projects by accusing them of elitism, foreignness, and corruption.

In contrast, other scholars referred to the populist attempt to engage with like-minded ‘peoples’ transnationally and to present counter-projects at the regional and global levels, even if they are based on ad-hoc, symbolic, and ideologically ambiguous frameworks.

Regarding potential effects, there was consensus that the behavior of populist leaders, particularly when they are in power, can undermine international cooperation and regional integration. However, a fruitful debate arose regarding the type of change expected in international cooperation, specifically in relation to the mechanisms of such change and to what extent they can influence the formulation, planning and implementation of policies.

Several participants stated that negative effects on state compliance (for example, with rules convened by immigration authorities and the World Trade Organization) will be evident in the short term. Other participants were more skeptical in this regard, indicating that populist discourse, styles, and ideas primarily exert their effects through delegitimizing mechanisms and that the symbolic impact of such performances on the international order can only be visualized over a longer time frame.

The conversation also focused on the potential impact of the populist attempt to reconstruct regional integration and the representational importance of identities in linking regional organizations with the ‘peoples’ to this end. Although institution building tends to accompany these processes of redefining regional organizations, this type of cooperation tends to empty regionalism of content and ultimately undermines the pillars of regional institutionalization.

The populist model of regional integration and international cooperation more broadly seems to be at odds with the possibility of achieving interstate collaboration to prevent, control, and mitigate new international challenges, including pandemics and climate change. In any case, the participants agreed that there is still a need for both theoretical and empirical research that evaluates the impact of global populism, the different types of institutional (dis-)engagement on the international scene, and the variation between regions.

International Security and Human Rights

The workshop continued the following day, Wednesday 23 June, with a roundtable on international security and human rights, which was moderated by Thomas Risse, professor at the Freie Universität of Berlin and Director of the Berlin International College of Research and Graduate Training (BIRT) of the SCRIPTS Cluster. The panelists were Marina Henke from Hertie School Berlin, Ronald Krebs from the University of Minnesota, Georg Löfflmann from the University of Warwick, and Frank Stengel from Kiel University.

Participants addressed an area that has received considerably less research attention than the other round table topics: the relationship between populism and security, as well as its policy implications. Populists are often described as ‘revisionist’ and ‘muscular’ in their approach to defense and human rights issues, yet there is little evidence regarding the international impact of such behavior.

Several recent cases in Eastern Europe (Crimea, Nagorno-Karabakh), Latin America (Venezuela, Nicaragua), the Middle East (Syria, Turkey, the Gaza Strip), and Southeast Asia (Kashmir, the Sino/Philippines sea), have raised the question of whether the dynamics of recent violent international conflicts may be linked to the presence of populist leaders in power.

Furthermore, given the simultaneous rise of populists to the governments of hegemonic countries, the populist approach to ‘balances of power’ (either global or regional) is particularly interesting. Scholars debated whether the populist implementation of security policies makes international relations more dangerous and unpredictable and whether this may have implications for humanitarian norms and the practices of state and non-state human rights organizations.

The scholars focused primarily on populist experiences in Europe and the United States. Right-wing European populists tend to favor military solutions to security problems, promoting defense spending and ad-hoc, hard-power approaches to multilateral cooperation in the face of security threats. Meanwhile, the experience of the United States highlights populist leaders’ frequent opposition to national security establishments and bureaucratic advocates of ‘American exceptionalism’ when it comes to defense and human rights issues.

Moreover, some panelists stressed that the Trump administration emphasized the discursive articulation of stigmatized ‘Others,’ which they blamed for various crises as a key strategy of political mobilization, thus enhancing ontological (in)security, antagonistic polarization, and ethno-national radicalization.

Regarding the question of impact, a key point that was raised concerned the possibility for states under populist leadership to execute a ‘grand strategy,’ which often requires continued legitimation, trust, and consensus amongst security authorities. Security policies are often a reflection of a charismatic populist leader’s highly emotional performance, and this top-down process tends to undermine expertise and fragment security authorities. Thus, national and international strategies tend to be victims of contemporary populism.

Moreover, since populists constantly exaggerate internal divisions to reinforce their polarizing narratives, it becomes more difficult to raise the resources necessary to pursue a grand strategy and make it sustainable. The anti-expertise, anti-intellectual, and anti-pluralistic focus on domestic enemies and the atmosphere of conspiracy make the realm of security even more dramatic, uncertain, and precarious than it usually is.

Still, the impact of populism on security issues is complex, mainly due to the difficulty of determining what affects populists’ policymaking in this regard, be it the ‘thin ideology’ (populism) or the ‘host ideology’ (nationalism, racism, authoritarianism, etc.). Some participants also discussed whether differences between inclusionary and exclusionary populism, as well as power capabilities, ideological affinities, and cultural aspects, can affect the scope of the impact. Similarly, other panelists argued that understanding populism as a style-oriented performative strategy may suggest that populism is ‘less dangerous’ than is often thought and is a normative and programmatic project more than an empirical and concrete one. This is an argument that should be more thoroughly examined.

Following on from this discussion, the participants considered whether populism has an analytical advantage over related notions and how greater precision in the conceptual framework employed could help to overcome existing epistemological and methodological difficulties.

International Economy, Trade, and Public Goods

The final roundtable of the workshop examined the populist impact on the international economy, trade, and public goods. The discussion was moderated by Tanja Börzel, professor at the Freie Universität Berlin and co-director of the SCRIPTS Cluster, and the participants were Jean-Christophe Boucher from the University of Calgary, Angelos Chryssogelos from the London Metropolitan University, and Amy Skonieczny from San Francisco State University.

The discussion first addressed the discursive practices of different populist leaders, movements, and parties in relation to socio-economic policies and trade agreements, identifying how policies changed when populists moved from the opposition to assume government power.

The participants thus referred to the existing variance in terms of economic and commercial policies and the international implications, based on the differences between right-wing and left-wing populism and the Global South versus the Global North, amongst other conditions.

Indeed, contemporary populist leaders have regularly asserted that they prioritize the economic needs of ‘the people,’ yet on some occasions, this discourse seeks to justify policies that act as a ‘stepping stone’ towards the liberalization of the international economy and, in other cases, to justify policies that act as a ‘stumbling block.’

There was also room to address more normative questions, such as whether this ‘populist era’ can change the socio-economic foundations of the international system in the medium- or long term, creating a world that is more ‘just’, ‘richer’, or ‘fairer,’ as well as whether it has any intended or unintended consequences for social cohesion, welfare policies, and levels of foreign aid spending.

There was consensus among the panelists that economic issues have always been central to populist performance. Since commerce, industry, and finance have tangible applications in the ‘real world,’ the results expose ‘real effects’ on ‘real people’ and therefore raise the question of who benefits from the policies of populist governments. The panelists agreed that these socio-economic issues are also closely related to emotions and, consequently, are particularly useful as tools that populist leaders can employ to increase the resonance of their affective narratives among their constituents.In this sense, the participants discussed the various strategies and discourses used to mobilize these emotions against ‘Others’ as a way of doing politics that aims to foment chaos and create an atmosphere of conspiracy.

On the other hand, participants emphasized that the populists’ international economic policies have generally focused more on rhetoric and imagery than on concrete guidelines. This is evidenced by the substantial variance among populists after they come to power in relation to the preference for protectionism or free trade, regardless of their electoral promises.

Indeed, populist claims about international trade and economics do not always materialize and soon reveal a sizeable gap between discourse and practice, as best illustrated by the Brexit process. This gap can be explained by arguing that populist leaders do not focus their preference on foreign policy issues, that they are influenced by domestic politics, or that their countries have structural power restrictions.

The participants shed light on the possible implications of the clash between populists and their audiences once it becomes clear that leaders are failing to fulfil their promises and the gap is publicly revealed. These arguments were considered particularly relevant when the discussion turned to other socio-economic areas, focusing on the populist management of public goods. This includes health issues related to the COVID-19 pandemic, which some populist leaders used as an additional narrative strategy to reinforce anti-elitist and anti-intellectual attitudes. To this end, the new media served as the main channel for spreading anti-vaccine ‘fake news’ and conspiracy theories regarding expert institutions, particularly pharmaceutical companies and intergovernmental health organizations, thus creating a climate of mistrust and delegitimation.

Conclusions

The workshop provided preliminary but insightful arguments about the effects of populism in contemporary global politics. It was deeply enriching to convene such a diverse and large number of scholars already working on this topic to begin a conversation on the international implications of populism in specific areas. There was consensus that this fruitful discussion should be continued with the aim of achieving substantial academic progress and disseminating future research.

In this sense, several participants expressed their willingness to participate in a joint publication project, which is expected to take the form of a special issue to be submitted to a prominent academic journal. Among the different ideas collected, an especially attractive suggestion was to address the changes that international relations is experiencing due to the diffusion of populism, categorizing these changes into three dimensions: polity, politics, and policies.

A second workshop may also contribute to the refinement of each individual investigation and the consolidation of the academic project, which aims to deepen our understanding of the impact of populist phenomena on the international order.