Lasting legacies of imperial collapse

The war in Ukraine came as a shock for many observers. Russia justified its attack against Ukraine with extremely vague and unspecific claims, remained similarly vague in terms of the objectives of the war, did not prepare its own population for the conflict, and did not even bother to create a puppet regime legitimizing aggression. There was hardly any domestic propaganda preparing the Russian population itself for the war (a propaganda effort started only a week after the invasion). At the same time, the brutality of the Russian army and its atrocities committed are growing more apparent by the day. From this point of view, the war created a new reality in Europe, where many old principles and ideas had to be rescinded and rethought.

If one, however, scales down on the post-Soviet Eurasia (rather than looking at the European or global context), the war appears less unexpected. In fact, it becomes part of a chain of events, which can be traced back to the early 1990s – the collapse of the Soviet Union. The dissolution of the USSR triggered military conflicts in various parts of the old empire – in the Caucasus (Georgia, Azerbaijan and Russian Northern Caucasus), in Central Asia (Tajikistan) and in Moldova. In other regions, irredentist movements did not use military action but their territories achieved substantial autonomy due to the weakness of the central government. At that moment of time, conflicts were perceived by many as an almost unavoidable consequence of the fragmentation of the USSR – in fact, the dissolution of the USSR followed a much more peaceful path than many feared (in comparison to what during that period was frequently referred to as a ‘Yugoslav scenario’ – the violent collapse of a socialist federation leading to lengthy wars). Over time, conflicts became ‘frozen’ to some extent and slowly but surely disappeared from view.

One of the main insights of the literature of ‘persistence studies’ in social sciences (Cirone & Pepinsky, 2021), however, is that legacies of the past exercise enormous influence on the contemporary political and social developments – and that 30 years of the period after the collapse of the USSR is an extremely short time span for these legacies to disappear. The example of Nagorny-Karabakh, which experienced a short but brutal war in 2020 (and where the conflict again escalated in 2022, amidst the war in Ukraine) demonstrated how the 30-year-old status quo can be quickly overturned in a violent way. Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine is fought at a different scale, yet the roots of this war are very similar, and can be traced back to the collapse of the USSR. From this perspective, the ‘Yugoslav scenario’ materialized 30 years later than one expected.

There is, however, a difference between the war in Ukraine and the conflict in Nagorny-Karabakh (or many other similar conflicts in Eurasia). Unlike with Nagorny-Karabakh, war against Ukraine appears to be a product of worldviews, illusions and misperceptions of one man – Vladimir Putin, and a small circle of individuals surrounding him. There are speculations that even the highest echelons of the Russian leadership were not informed about the war. Thus, the legacies of imperial collapse can be even more insidious than one could have thought; that is, it suffices for a small group of political elites to live in past realities to cause an unprecedented crisis in the current moment. A ‘Yugoslav scenario’ came to fruition in Eurasia without strong irredentist movements in Ukraine and without public support in Russia– only because one man wanted it to happen.

Strategic humility (and strategic patience)

Unfortunately, the discussion so far leads to a rather pessimistic conclusion. The war dashes naïve hopes that time and economic interdependence will mitigate the shadow of legacies of imperial collapse. Acknowledging this pessimistic conclusion requires a radical re-thinking of the foreign policy of European nations. Governments will have to learn to embrace an idea, which was almost natural to the foreign policy communities during the Cold War, but was thoroughly forgotten over the last decades: there are crises in the world (even in Europe!), which cause enormous human suffering and for which no quick remedies or simple solutions exist. Even more, another forgotten wisdom from the past seems to be that things can always get worse. There is always potential for further escalation or for a more destructive conflict.

The actions of the West – in the first month and a half of the war, at least – show only partial understanding of this reality. Luckily, NATO has refrained from direct military involvement in the conflict, even with all associated threats of nuclear escalation. Instead, the West has responded to the Russian aggression with unprecedented economic sanctions. In addition to governments sanctioning the Russian economy, numerous private actors – from business to culture and science – have cut ties to Russia. These sanctions, without a doubt, harm the Russian economy. The role of private actors is as of now even bigger than that of the official sanctions. The question remains whether these sanctions are indeed designed in a way to bring about a change in Putin’s behavior or to de-escalate the crisis.

First, to serve as an incentive, sanctions should be tied to specific actions of the Russian government, with specific conditions under which they could be removed. Today, the statements of the Western leaders in this respect are contradictory. What should sanctions achieve? A ceasefire in Ukraine, withdrawal of Russian forces (also from Donbass, and also from Crimea?) or the end of Putin’s regime? If that last possibility is the case, Putin certainly will not seek any compromises with the West or Ukraine. As long as the rhetoric of the West is unclear (and, even more, there are no credible commitments to a particular course of actions, which are, given the rhetorical chaos to date, very difficult to create), sanctions will create no incentives for the Russian leadership to stop the war.

Equally important is the fact that the way sanctions were communicated to the public, in combination with extremely belligerent rhetoric, was used by the Russian regime to strengthen its narrative. Explaining sanctions (and conditions under which they will be revoked) to the Russian people is an essential element of making sanctions successful, and aggressive generic statements about sanctions having the goal to cripple Russian economy are counterproductive.

Some aspects of sanctions rhetoric are even more opaque. For example, what exactly is meant by the self-declared commitment of European nations to fully stop buying Russian oil and gas in a couple of years? That the EU members are certain that there will be no positive change in Russian politics (a scenario, which is not implausible at all) but at the same time feel no need to keep any instruments of economic pressure against Russia in future crises? A much poorer Russia selling gas and oil to China at a lower price will, however, be more immune to economic pressure from the West. And without economic ties the EU will be unable to influence Russia’s foreign policy and domestic developments. And do the EU members believe that Putin will silently wait until Europe cuts its gas ties to Russia and not try to escalate current – or future – international crises?

Second, sanctions (especially governmental and private ones) frequently contradict each other. For example, freezing the assets of the Russian central bank had the goal of making it more difficult for Russia to maintain the ruble exchange rate. However, at the same time international payments systems ceased their activity in Russia – which means that they simultaneously made it more difficult for the ordinary Russians to transfer money abroad – making it easier for the Russian government to maintain the ruble exchange rate.

Third, while sanctions fundamentally are difficult to design in a way that they influence only a specific group of regime loyalists, the current sanctions regime in some areas specifically affects groups that are significantly more likely to oppose Putin than others. Scientific sanctions are particularly harmful and meaningless. Even if some Russian scholars support Putin (which is unfortunately true), scientists are precisely the group where dissidence and free thinking are particularly likely to emerge. However, Western nations (and especially Germany) have introduced sanctions which specifically target scientists. The only result of this approach, however, is that the West is going to alienate and drive away precisely the pro-Western group of scientists. Is there any hope for a new Andrei Sakharov (one of the key actors of the Soviet dissident movement, who played a crucial role during the Perestroika, and a distinguished scholar) under these conditions if the new iron curtain is constructed from two sides?

In the same way, the main victims from the withdrawal of Visa and Mastercard from Russia appear to be Russians fleeing Putin’s regime and who are unable to access their money abroad – because within Russia national payment systems turn out to be viable substitutes for the international cards. Generally speaking, private actors (companies, non-governmental organizations or universities) very often do much more than the official sanctions prescribe – and as a result, introduce measures targeting ‘wrong’ groups and improve Putin’s ability to use sanctions as part of his legitimation strategy.

To date, the way sanctions have been introduced and communicated seems to strengthen Putin’s narrative in the eyes of Russians of Russia as a besieged fortress under attack by the West – and in fact, sanctions are an important factor contributing to Russians’ support of Putin and his regime.

These problems have been discussed by scholars studying sanctions for decades, yet seem to play a very limited role in the decision-making by Western actors. One cannot shake the impression that for many institutions and actors cutting their ties to Russia the most important goal is not to actually change Putin’s behavior but to publicly demonstrate one’s moral stance. Economics calls this type of action expressive behavior and caution about risks associated with it (Hillmann, 2010). This expressive behavior can be driven by the discursive climate in society or even by the psychological void emerging from a feeling of a loss of control. The core to this expressive stance, in any case, is precisely the deeply rooted conviction that crises like the one in Eastern Europe can be resolved, and very fast. This urge to act is understandable given the immense human suffering in Ukraine – but it does not really help. Moral high ground does not protect democracy and freedom.

Conclusion

In the eyes of many observers, the war in Ukraine constitutes a fundamental breach of the world order, a ‘new reality’. In actuality, it is something even more dangerous and threatening – an example of us fundamentally misunderstanding and overestimating the stability of some regions of the world, including Eastern Europe. Potential conflicts associated with the collapse of old empires can resurface any time, even if they exist only in the imagination of a small group of elite actors. And in most cases these conflicts do not have simple solutions, a fact which requires the West to reassess its ability to structure the world order.

The lack of simple solutions, however, does not mean that nothing can be done. On the contrary, it makes passive inaction even more dangerous. For example, the questions posed in this essay concerning the current sanctions policy do not imply that sanctions are per se a flawed and useless instrument. They certainly belong to the political toolbox of dealing with crises. However, it may very well be that there exists no combination of sanctions – no matter how severe they are – that can change Putin’s calculus in the short run. It is also possible that some sanctions do more harm than good. Negotiations, with inevitable compromises and second-best solutions, therefore remain a crucial element in attempts to stop the war.

References

Hillman, Arye L., 2010. "Expressive behavior in economics and politics", European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 403-418, December 2010.

Cirone, Alexandra, and Pepinsky, Thomas B. 2022. "Historical Persistence", Annual Review of Political Science, vol 25(1).

Last edits for this blog entry were on 14 April 2022, 16:00 p.m. CEST.

Prof. Dr. Alexander Libman is an incoming Principal Investigator at SCRIPTS and Professor of Russian and East European Politics at the Freie Universität Berlin.